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who offers neither his support nor his
name, claim a right in his illegitimate
child. Rights and responsibilities of father-
hood are concomitant; an unwed father







On May 31, 1977, the Supreme Court
of the United States decided the case of
Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v.
Hodory, 97 S. Ct. 1898, regarding the
asserted right of an employee furloughed
as a result of a coal strike to receive
unemployment benefits. In 1974 Leonard
Hodory was employed by United States
Steel Corporation to work in a steel mill
in Youngstown, Ohio. The United Mine
Workers went out on stirke at all coal
mines owned by United States Steel Cor-
poration (USS) and by Republic Steel
Corporation. These company-owned
mines supplied the fuel used in the opera-
tion of manufarturing facilities of USS and
Republic. As a result of the strike the fuel
supply at the Youngstown plant was
reduced. The plant eventually was shut
down and in November 1974 Hodory was
furloughed. Hodory applied to the ap-
pellant state agency for unemployment
benefits. On January 3, 1975 the ap-
pellant disallowed his claim under OHIO
REV. Code §4141.29(D)(1) (a) which pro-
vides that a worker may not receive
unemployment benefits if: "His
unemployment was due to a labor dispute
other than a lockout at any factory, estab-
lishment, or other premises located in this
or any other state and owned or operated
by the employer by which he is or was last
employed; and for so long as his
unemployment is due to such labor dis-
pute."
On January 27 Hodory filed a com-
plaint based on 42 U.S.C. §1983 in the
United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf
of himself and "all others similarly
situated" who had been or in the future
would be denied benefits under
§4141.29(D)(1)(a). The court held that
the statute as applied to Hodory entitled
him to unemployment benefits. The State
appealed the decision to the Supreme
Court of the United States and in an 8-0
decision (Mr. Justice Rehnquist not par-
ticipating) the Court reversed the District
Court.
The Supreme Court held that (1) the
abstention doctrine was not applicable in
this case; (2) the Ohio statute was neither
in conflict with, nor pre-empted by, the
Social Security Act or the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act; and (3) the
statute had a rational relation to a legiti-
mate state interest and did not violate the
Equal Protection or Due Process clauses
of the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court's decision as to the
abstention doctrine was based upon the
fact that the state voluntarily chose to
submit to a federal forum and principles of
comity do not demand that the federal
court force the case back into the State's
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Hodory argued that the Ohio statute
was pre-empted by 42 U.S.C. §503(a)(1)
and (3), as amended, of the Social
Security Act (SSA) of 1935, the Employ-
ment Security Amendments of 1970 and
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA), 26 U.S.C. §§3301-3311, as
amended. Hodory advanced the argument
that the state may not deny benefits to
those who, like him, were unemployed
under circumstances where the unemploy-
ment is not the fault of the employee. He
also contended that the SSA forbid dis-
qualification of persons laid off due to a
labor dispute at a related plant. In
response, Mr. Justice Blackmun speaking
for the court stated that, "a reading of the
entire Report of the Committee on Eco-
nomic Security, which became the cor-
nerstone of the SSA, shows that Congress
did not intend to require that the States
give coverage to every person involun-
tarily unemployed." 97 S.Ct. at 1905. He
went on to say that, "the history shows
Congress did not intend to restrict the
ability of the States to legislate with
respect to persons in Hodory's position."
97 S.Ct. at 1906. The report reflects
through various provisions that
unemployment compensation schemes
generally do not grant full benefits im-
mediately and indefinitely even to those
involuntarily unemployed. The report also
does not direct that funds must be dis-
pensed but rather cautions against funds
being dispensed too freely.
Hodory also claimed that "innocent"
persons could not be disqualified from
unemployment compensation based on
§5(d) of draft bills issued by the Social
Security Board shortly after passage of
the SSA. The Court pointed out, however,
that the cover page of the draft bills
booklet explicitly stated, "these drafts are
merely suggestive... Therefore they can't
properly be termed 'model' bills or even
recommended bills. This is in keeping
with the policy of the Social Security
Board of recognizing that it is the final
responsibility and the right of each State
to determine for itself just what type of
legislation it desires and how it shall be
drafted." 97 S.Ct. at 1907.
Additionally, Hodory argued that "in-
nocent" persons could not be disqualified
from unemployment compensation pur
suant to the legislative history of the
Employment Security Amendments of
1970. This history, however, recognizes
that the States continue to be free to
"specify the conditions for disqualifica-
tion such as for... unemployment due to a
labor dispute in the worker's plant,
etc..." 97 S.Ct. at 1908.
Hodory, in contending that the States
were pre-empted by the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act, did not effec-
tively narrow his argument to include pre
emption as to labor dispute qualifications.
The Court felt Congress showed no intent
vis-a-vis the FUTA to totally pre-empt the
State and restrict its freedom to legislate
on the subject of labor disqualifications.
97 S.Ct. at 1908. Hodory could not cite
any provision of the Act which would
mitigate against this conclusion.
The Court lastly turned to the question
of whether the statute as applied was irra-
tional, without valid public purpose, and
thus, in violation of the Equal Protection
and Due Process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. The statute did not involve
any discernible fundamental right, or
affect with particularity any protected
class which would have required the State
to show a compelling interest for the
Court to uphold the statute. Hodory con-
ceded that the test of constitutionality
was whether the statute had a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest.
In approaching this question the Court
pointed out that the unemployment com-
pensation statute touched upon more than
just the recipient. It provided for the crea
tion of a fund produced by contributions
from private employers. The rate of an
employer's contribution to the fund
varied according to benefits paid to that
employer's eligible employees. Ohio Rev.
Code §4141.25. Hodory urged the Court
to consider only the needs of the
employee seeking compensation. Hodo-
ry's position was contrary to the principle
enunciated in Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 486 (1970), that "the four-
teenth amendment gives the federal
courts no power to impose upon the
States their views of what constitutes wise
economic or social policy."
In considering the constitutionality of
the statute, the Court viewed its conse-
quences, not only to the recipient of
benefits but also to the contributors to the
fund and the fiscal integrity of the fund.
The Court found that the statute on its
face was rationally related to a legitimate
State interest, specifically, the protection
of the employer. The Court elaborated
that if a union goes out on strike the
employer's contributions to the fund are
not increased, but if the employer locks
employees out, all his employees thus put
out of work are compensated and the
employer's contributions to the fund ac-
cordingly are increased. "If the classifica-
tion has some 'reasonable basis' it does
not offend the Constitution simply
because the classification is not made with
mathematical nicety or because it results
in some inequality. Lindsley u. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78."
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Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 485
(1970).
It was found that the State had two ad-
ditional interests at stake. First, the grant-
ing of benefits would place the employer
at an unfair disadvantage in negotiations
with the unions. The employer's costs go
up with every laid-off worker who is
qualified to collect unemployment. The
only way for the employer to stop its ris-
ing costs is to settle the strike so as to
return the employees to work. Qualifica-
tion for unemployment compensation
thus acts as a lever, increasing the pres-
sure on an employer to settle a strike. The
State chose to leave this lever in existence
for situations in which the employer
locked out his employees, but to eliminate
it if the union made the strike move. The
approach taken by Ohio was found not to
be irrational. 97 S.Ct. at 1910. Secondly,
the State had an interest in protecting the
fiscal integrity of its compensation fund
and the statute was rationally related to
this interest.
The Court was unable to discern the
basis for a claim that Hodory had been
denied substantive due process of law and
Hodory made no claim of denial of pro-
cedural due process.
Voluntary affirmative action, called
into question in the context of admission
to professional schools in Bakke v.
Regents of the University of California,
18 Cal.3d 34, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 553
P.2d 1152 (1976), cert. granted, 429
U.S. 1090 (1977), suffered a setback in
the recent case of Weber v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 563 F.2d
216 (5th Cir. 1977). In Weber, the Fifth
Circuit found that a joint program of affir-
mative action entered into by a union and
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employer violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2
et seq. The affirmative action before the
court was a quota which was established
for admittance into an on-the-job training
program for entry into the craft positions
in all Kaiser plants. Its effect was to create
an entrance ratio of one minority worker
to each white until the percentage of
minority craft workers roughly approxi-
mated the proportion of minorities in the
surrounding local population.
The district court found the training
program defective on two grounds: One,
only courts may implement quota relief
and even then only with great caution;
Two, under the facts of this case a quota
system would not be warranted even if or
dered by the court in light of the fact that
those preferred workers were not iden-
tifiable victims of discrimination and
there had, in fact, been no past dis-
crimination by this employer. The circuit
court affirmed on the second ground only,
holding that while voluntary compliance
with Title VII was laudable and preferable
to litigation, the facts of this case did not
warrant quota relief. Despite the court's
support for voluntary compliance, the
decision in Weber can be expected to dis
courage that remedy. Essential to the
court's ruling was the finding by the dis-
trict judge that there had been no proof of
past discrimination by Kaiser, this despite
an apparent disparity between the propor-
tion of black craftsmen at Kaiser and the
percentage of blacks in the local popula-
tion. The court was unconvinced by the
employer's argument that the the effects
of past societal discrimination were far-
reaching and could be remedied only
through a "one-for-one" training pro-
gram.
Equally unconvincing was the argu-
ment that the quota system was instituted
at the behest of the Office of Federal Con-
tract Compliance (OFCC) in its attempt
to enforce Executive Order 11246, 30
Fed. Reg. 12319, which requires federal
contractors to take affirmative action to
obtain a fair percentage of minorities in
their workforces. On this point, the dis-
trict court had found that the collective
bargaining agreement in question
"reflected less of a desire on Kaiser's part
to train black craft workers than a self in-
terest in satisfying the OFCC in order to
retain lucrative government contracts."
563 F.2d at 226. While the circuit court
recognized the legitimacy of affirmative
action plans implemented under Execu-
tive Order 11246, such as the "Philadel-
phia Plan", see Contractors Ass'n of
Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of
Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied 404 U.S. 854 (1971), it held that
in the absence of prior discrimination, the
Executive Order may not override the
contradictory congressional provision
against quota hiring found in Section
703(d) of Title VII.
This decision places an employer in the
bind of having to choose between await-
ing litigation charging past racial bias
against blacks or other minorities or in-
itiating a plan to remedy the underutiliza-
tion of minorities and inviting a reverse
discrimination charge. It is difficult to
conceive of employers who would be will-
ing to admit a past pattern or practice of
minority discrimination prior to imple-
menting affirmative action plans volun-
tarily or with the encouragement of
OFCC.
Judge Wisdom, in his dissent, pointed
out that the majority in Weber requires
the employer to guess what a district
court might find in the event that
employer is sued for discrimination.
Should the employer guess that the dis-
trict court would find past discrimination,
and thus institute a voluntary affirmative
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